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The task of identifying what information is material to an investment
and voting decisions is a continuing one in the field of securities
regulation.'

I. INTRODUCTION
One focus of securities regulation in the United States is to
ensure that purchasers and sellers possess all necessary information

1. Proposed Comprehensive Revision to System For Registration of Securities Offerings,
Securities Act Release No. 6235, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,693, 63,694 (Sept. 25, 1980) [hereinafter
Securities Act Release No. 6235].

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol20/iss3/4

2

Prozan and Fatale: Revisiting "Truth in Securities": The Use of the Efficient Capita

1992]

REVISITING "TRUTH IN SECURITIES"

when making investment decisions. The Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act" or "'33 Act") and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
("Exchange Act" or "'34 Act") seek to accomplish this informational
adequacy with a two-pronged approach. The registration provisions of
the Securities Act and the reporting provisions of the Exchange Act
respectively ensure that issuers using the capital markets provide
adequate, timely information to initial purchasers of those securities
and continually to the markets. Rule 10b-5 and other insider trading
laws declare the use of certain types of information off-limits to market participants.2 These laws deny the use of information not generally available to the market and obtained through a special duty to a
company to prevent use of an advantage not available to other market
participants. Additionally, the use of Rule 10b-5 has been expanded
to remedy material misstatements or omissions, absent insider trading.
The use of 10b-5 as a remedy for disclosure violations thrusts it into
a critical role in the regulatory process.3
The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis ("ECMH") has substantially impacted the development of these areas of securities regulation.4 Application of the ECMIH to these areas of securities law has

2. "Insider trading laws" refers to Rule lOb-5 promulgated under Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as well as Sections 16 and 20A of that Act. Judicial
application of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis has occurred only with respect to
Rule lOb-5.
3. In general, the cases discussed in this article involve the use of Rule lob-5 to
remedy disclosures rather than as an insider trading provision. Since its inception, this expanded use of Rule lOb-5 has been consistently controversial. Compare the majority and
dissent discussions in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied
sub norn. Coates v. SEC & Kline v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); and Heit v. Weitzen, 402
F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); Roeder v.
Alpha Indus. Inc., 814 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1987); Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545 (2d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946, and reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 911 (1980). Academic
literature on the topic also remains mixed. For those opposed to this use of Rule 10b-5, see
Milton H. Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340, 1370 n.89 (1966).
For those in favor- of this use, see Jeffrey D. Bauman, Rule 10b-5 and the Corporation's
Affirmative Duty to Disclose, 67 GEo. L.J. 935 (1979). Steve Thel, The Original Conception
of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385 (1990), discusses the
history of Section 10(b) as a market regulation provision, rather than as a disclosure provision.
4. The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis posits that the market for a security fully
reflects all available information about a security. The theory takes three forms: weak, semistrong, and strong. In the weak form, stock prices reflect past price histories. The semi-strong
form assumes that stock prices fully reflect all publicly available information. The strong
form posits that all information knowable about a security, public or not, is reflected in its
price. The semi-strong form is widely accepted and was the model adopted for incorporating
the theory in securities regulation. See Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the
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occurred unevenly, creating an imbalance in its operation. This Article
examines the incorporation of that theory in the '33 Act registration
provisions for domestic issuers and Rule 10b-5 case law. The discussion shows that the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or
"Commission") applies the ECMH restrictively to the '33 Act registration provisions; however, the courts espouse expansive interpretations in finding reliance in Rule lOb-5 cases. In particular, the courts
have often applied the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance in
situations where the issuer in question would not have qualified for
the reduced disclosure provisions of the integrated disclosure system
in a primary equity offering.5 This dichotomy occurs despite the fact

Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARv. L. REV. 747, 748 (1985) (noting that information technology will aid in developing a more efficient market, but advocating "some limited
form of disclosure"). For a technical discussion of the ECMH, see Eugene F. Fama, Efficient
Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970). A more
general discussion can be found in JAMEs H. LoIUE & MARY T. HAMILTON, THE STOCK

MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 70-97 (1973); see also Christopher Paul Saari, Note, The
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regulation of the Securities
Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1031 (1977); John M. Salmanowitz, Note, Broker Investment
Recommendations and the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis: A Proposed Cautionary
Legend, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1077 (1977). The importance of the ECMH stems from the belief
that capital markets serve to allocate ownership of equity and that the prices in those markets
serve as signals for resource allocation. Some authors feel that stock prices have little effect
on the allocation of economic resources and thus that the role of capital markets as an
efficient pricing mechanism may not be all that important. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, The
Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 613 (1988).
The adoption of the ECMH by the SEC and the courts affects primarily the secondary
market. See infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text. Mispricing of initial public offerings
frequently occurs and remains problematic. See Stout, supra, at 664. Stout argues that federal
securities regulation promotes inefficiency in the primary market by permitting underwriters to
stabilize an offering. Id
5. A primary equity offering as distinguished from an initial public offering ("IPO")
involves an original issuance of equity securities by a company whose securities (whether of
the same or a different class) already trade on one of the existing stock markets. An IPO
involves an issuance on the public markets by a company whose securitie' have never been
previously traded on the public markets. Our remarks on the integrated disclosure system
throughout this article are focused on the system as it applies to primary equity offerings. To
use the integrated disclosure system for a primary equity offering, an issuer must have,
among other things: (1) voting stock of an aggregate market value of $150 million held by
nonaffiliates, or (2) a) $100 million aggregate market value of voting stock held by
nonaffiliates, and b) an annual trading volume of 3 million shares. See 17 C.F.R. §
239.13(a)-(b) (1988). For a discussion of instances where the courts have applied the fraudon-the-market theory of reliance where the issuer would not have received the benefit of
reduced disclosure in a primary equity offering, see L. Brett Lockwood, Note, The Fraud-onthe-Market Theory: A Contrarian Kew, 38 EMORY L.J. 1269, 1316 (1989). Mr. Lockwood
used MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL, STANDARD & POOR'S STOCK GUIDE and STANDARD &
POOR'S PROFILES to determine that the issuers in the following cases were subjected to lOb-5
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that both results are premised on the existence of an efficient capital
market. Even the securities of Basic, Inc., the subject of the Supreme
Court decision validating the fraud-on-the-market presumption, would
not have qualified
for reduced disclosure in the event of a primary
6
equity offering.
Stating the assumptions behind the two approaches helps one
understand the differences between them. The SEC incorporated the
ECMH into the registration provisions on the premise that brokerage
house and other industry research on an issuer means that the issuer's
securities trade in an efficient market. On the other hand, courts take
the position that issuers listed on the NYSE or the AMEX, as well as
those widely traded in the over-the-counter ("OTC") market, trade in
an efficient market, for purposes of establishing the reliance element
in a Rule lOb-5 cause of action.
Some may prefer the present system because it assures the most
information provided to the market through the disclosure system and
the greatest liability in court actions. This Article posits that the incorporation of the ECMH in the registration provisions and
Rule 10b-5 actions should be done consistently. Applying the theory
consistently will result in either increasing the ability of issuers to use
the integrated disclosure system in the registration process, decreasing
the courts' use of the fraud-on-the-market theory, or both.7 In any
event, a more consistent application of the theory will reduce the
costs to issuers and their investors without diminishing investor protection.

liability despite market capitalization which was below the minimum SEC threshold:
Rosenberg v. Digilog Inc., 648 F. Supp. 40 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (market capitalization of at most
$18 million during class period); In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig. v. Cicconi, 103 F.R.D.
130 (D.N.J. 1984) (market capitalization of at most $75 million during class period); Wolgin
v. Magic Marker Corp., 82 F.R.D. 168 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (market capitalization of at most
$72 million during class period); Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 79 (M.D. Fla. 1977)
(market capitalization of at most $17 million).
A secondary offering involves sales by holders of securities where the issuer receives no funds from the sales. The '33 Act also applies to these transactions. In general,
secondary offerings are not the focus of this article.
6. See Lockwood, Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, supra note 5 (finding that in
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), the company at issue, Basic, Inc., had a
capitalization of at most $45 million during the class period).
7. Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier H. Kraakman fust suggested the "dual market" approach as an analytical tool in The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549,
627 (1984). They felt that the dual market approach established that "the case for entirely
deregulating insider trading is weak, and that the case against mandatory disclosure is far
from convincing." I&aat 629.
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We take the position that the ability to use the integrated disclosure system should be increased. We take this approach for four
reasons. First, since the last substantial amendment to the integrated
disclosure system in 1982, speed and access to information has increased, ensuring that market professionals receive more information
and receive it faster.8 Second, the courts have been expanding the
definition of when a stock trades in an efficient market and are unlikely to reverse this trend. Third, making more issuers eligible for
integrated disclosure increases the reliability of and accountability for
'34 Act reporting.9 Fourth, the present system requires that issuers
and investors "pay," through increased registration costs, for additional information not needed by investors under the expansive court
holdings.
We also take the position that the fraud-on-the-market rulings of
the federal courts have been too expansive. These rulings burden
issuers and their investors with substantial costs and ideally would be
restricted by either Commission rulemaking, congressional legislation,
'or further Supreme Court clarification of the pertinent issues.
The Article begins by discussing the integrated disclosure system,
its origin, the adoption of the present system, and its technical requirements. Next we turn to the "fraud-on-the-market" theory. Here
we focus on the validation of the theory in Basic and the tests used
in the post-Basic cases to establish the existence of an efficient market for a particular security. We conclude that while subtle differences
may exist in the methodology used, the cases generally reach the
same result. Further, the result is inconsistent with the application of
the ECMH in the registration provisions. We then discuss the possible
types of systemic changes based on these differences and conclude
that expanding the use of the integrated disclosure system and decreasing the use of the fraud-on-the-market theory of reliance would
make the application of the ECMH more consistent and maintain
investor protection at a lower cost to issuers.

8. For an overview of the impact of the speed of information on the securities markets, see Langevoort, supra note 4. The SEC's Electronic Data Gathering and Retrieval
(EDGAR) system is in its final stages of testing. In the very near future, issuers will be required to file their disclosure reports electronically. Subscribers to the system will be able to
get this information much faster than at present.
9. Reliability and accountability increase because the use of incorporation by reference
in '33 Act offerings subjects '34 Act documents to '33 Act liability.
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTEGRATED DIsCLOsuRE SYSTEM

Generally, the '33 Act regulates the issuance and sale of securities, while the '34 Act regulates the market for securities and broker
dealers selling securities. The '33 Act regulates the offer and sale of
securities in public offerings by requiring registration of the securities
offered and sold. The SEC developed the integrated disclosure system
to ease the regulatory burden on issuers registering securities under
the '33 Act.10
This section examines the technical development of the SEC's
registration requirements for securities of domestic issuers. It traces
the origin of the process, adoption of the system and technical requirements of the present forms. The review provides guidance for
the changes suggested in our conclusion.
A.

Origin of the Process

In 1966, Milton Cohen published his seminal article, "Truth in
Securities" Revisited," calling for substantially more integration between the registration provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and
the ongoing reporting provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. Cohen noted that the '33 Act's registration, disclosure, and
prospectus delivery requirements developed without regard to the
continuous reporting system established in 1934 by the Securities and
Exchange Act.12 This bifurcated development caused a system of
needless duplication and confusion. From Cohen's article grew a
movement to integrate the '33 and '34 Acts.
Through the late 1960s into the early 1980s, the Commission
embarked on a series of revisions intended to simplify the registration
and disclosure process. 3 The process began in 1967, with the adop-

10. The SEC adopted the integrated disclosure system in Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 6383/Exchange Act Release No. 18,524, 47 Fed.
Reg. 11,380 (Mar. 16, 1982) [hereinafter Securities Act Release No. 6383/Exchange Act
Release No. 18,524].
11. 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340 (1966).
12. Actually, President Roosevelt sought to enact legislation regulating both securities
issuances and exchanges simultaneously. However, early attempts at such a bill failed. RALPH

F. DE BEDTS, THE NEW DEAL'S SEC, THE FORMATIVE YEARs 56 (1964).
13. For examples of these changes, see Securities Act Release No. 6383/Exchange Act
Release No. 18,524, supra note 10 (adopting three new forms for the registration of securities); Amendments to Annual Report Form, Related Forms, Rules, Regulations, and Guides;
Integration of Securities Acts Disclosure Systems, Securities Act Release No. 6231/Exchange
Act Release No. 17,114, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,630 (Sept. 25, 1980) (comprehensive changes to
Form 10-K indicating that the markets seek the same basic information package as purchasers
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tion of Form S-7. 4 Criteria for use of this early Form centered on a
strong record of earnings and continuity of management and business. 5 Use of Form S-7 meant reduced information in the '33 Act
provided by incorregistration process, without the investor protection
16
poration by reference of '34 Act documents.
Responding to the "Wheat Report,"' 17 the Commission took
steps to strengthen the '34 Act reporting system to provide better
information to the trading markets and provide for more coordination
with the '33 Act. To this end, quarterly reporting through Form 10-Q
replaced the existing requirement of semiannual reporting.' 8 The next

of newly issued securities); General Revision of Regulation S-X, Securities Act Release
No. 6233/Exchange Act Release No. 17,116, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,660 (Sept. 25, 1980) [hereinafter Securities Act Release No. 6233/Exchange Act Release No. 17,116] and Uniform Instructions as to Financial Statements-Regulation S-X, Securities Act Release No. 6234/Exchange
Act Release No. 17,117, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,682 (Sept. 25, 1980) (amending regulation S-X to
eliminate duplication with GAAP, improve financial reporting and centralize financial reporting
requirements to ensure similar disclosure in "33 and '34 Act documents).
14. Form S-7, Securities Act Release No. 4886, 32 Fed. Reg. 17,933 (Dec. 18, 1967)
[hereinafter Securities Act Release No. 4886]. See Securities Act Release No. 6235, supra
note I (discussion of the history of the process). The Commission explicitly adopted this
form as an experiment.
15. See Securities Act Release No. 4886, supra note 14. Specifically, the criteria included: (1) a) registration of equity securities under § 12(b) of the '34 Act, or b) organization
under the laws of the United States or a political subdivision thereof, with a principal place
of business in the U.S. or its territories and equity securities registered under § 12(g) of the
'34 Act; (2) issuer being subject to and complying with Exchange Act §§ 13 and 14 for five
fiscal years; (3) no change in the general business of the registrant over the past five fiscal
years; (4) a majority of the existing board serving as directors during each of the last three
fiscal years; (5) no default on borrowed money, including sinking fund installments, over the
past ten years; (6) net income of $2.5 million for the last fiscal year and $1 million for the
previous four fiscal years (both after taxes-but before extraordinary items net of tax effect),
for the issuer and consolidated subsidiaries, and gross revenues or sales of at least $50
million; and (7) for common stock and securities convertible into common stock, all dividends paid over the last five fiscal years on all securities were earned in that year, with
stock dividends being charged to the earned surplus account, such charge being equal to the
fair market value of the stock issued as a dividend. See Securities Act Release No. 6235,
supra note 1, at 63,696.
16. Incorporating a '34 Act document by reference into a '33 Act registration statement
subjects the issuer to the in terrorein liability provisions of the '33 Act for the incorporated
document without requiring the issuer to provide duplicative information to investors or the
market.
17. In November 1967, along with the adoption of Form S-7, the Commission announced the formation of an internal group to study the operation of the disclosure provisions
of the '33 and '34 Acts. Commissioner Francis Wheat headed the team. Accordingly, the report, released in 1969, was entitled the "Wheat Report."
18. See Securities Act Release No. 6235, supra note 1. Form 10-Q was adopted in
Quarterly Reporting Form, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9004, 35 Fed. Reg. 17,537
(Nov. 14, 1970). In this release, the Commission found that Forms 8-K were sporadically
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step involved the adoption of '33 Act registration Form S-16, which
reduced prospectus disclosure requirements by providing for incorporation by reference to Exchange Act reports.1 9 Additionally, the
Commission expanded the disclosure in and dissemination of annual
reports to security holders.2"
In 1976, the Commission refined the system. Use of Forms S-7
and S-16 were amended to -permit use by more issuers subject to the
Exchange Act reporting requirements.2 Simultaneously, the Commission rescinded Form S-9, a document implemented in 1954 for nonconvertible debt offerings, because "virtually all issuers who qualified
to use Form S-9" could now use Form S-7.22 As the Commission
considered expanding the use of Form S-16, it received a report from
the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure ("ACCD Report")
which suggested further integration. In response to the ACCD Report,
the Commission expanded the types of transactions eligible for S-16
registration.23
In 1980, the Commission continued reducing disclosure obliga-

filed by issuers and infrequently used by investors.
19. Optional Form for Registration of Additional Issues of Securities Registered on
National Securities Exchanges, or for Offerings to Holders of Certain Classes of Convertible
Securities, or to Holders of Certain Types of Warrants, Securities Act Release No. 5117, 36
Fed. Reg. 777 (Jan. 16, 1971). Initially, eligibility to use the Form was extremely restrictive.
Basically, it was available to issuers meeting the eligibility requirements of Form S-7 for
registration of secondary market transactions.
20. See Securities Act Release No. 6235, supra note 1, at 63,697.
21. See Amendments to Disclosure Items of Forms S-7 and S-16, Securities Act Release
No. 5791, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,304 (Dec. 28, 1976). The changes were: (1) the expanded use of
the forms to permit use by any companies with equity or debt registered under '34 Act
§ 12(b) or § 15(d) companies (additionally requiring that § 15(d) companies must have
provided an annual report to security holders within 12 months of the offering); (2) reduced
the time of compliance with the "34 Act from five years to 36 calendar months and timeliness requirement from three years to 12 calendar months; (3) eliminated the continuity of
management requirement; (4) reduced the no default requirement from ten years to
36 calendar months; (5) reduced the minimum earnings requirement from $500,000 for each
of the last five fiscal years to $250,000 for three of the last four fiscal years, including the
present fiscal year; (6) eliminated the requirement that dividends over the past five fiscal
years have been paid from earnings; (7) permitted all successor entities to be S-7 eligible if
predecessor was eligible; (8) permitted the use of the form where securities were guaranteed
by an eligible parent owning a majority of the issuer; and (9) expanded eligible consideration
from cash to include exchange offers.
22. See Securities Act Release No. 6235, supra note 1, at 63,697 n.30.
23. See Short Forms For Registration of Securities, Securities Act Release No. 5923, 43
Fed. Reg. 16,672 (Apr. 11, 1978). The additional transactions included primary offerings of
debt or equity offerings by companies with a market capitalization of $50 million, offerings
to existing security holders pursuant to rights or dividend reinvestment plans, and offerings to
holders of convertible securities or holders of outstanding transfera le warrants.
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tions for registrants through adoption of new Form S-15, which provided for reduced issuer disclosure in certain business combination
transactions. 24
B. Adoption of Present System
Based on the recommendations in the ACCD Report, the Commission proposed the three-tier structure presently in effect. 25 The
Commission divided issuers into three groups based on: (1) longevity
of '34 Act reporting obligations; (2) dissemination and professional
analysis of '34 Act reports; and (3) financial stability.2 6 The Agency
focused on determining the necessary information to be received in a
'33 Act registration statement, how to provide the information, and
who should receive the information.27

24. Form S-15, the predecessor to the current Form S-4, required, in addition to the
Form S-7 tests, that: (1) the transaction be a) a Rule 145(a) transaction (generally a reclassification of securities, merger, consolidation, or acquisition of assets), b) a merger not requiring a vote by security holders of the target company 'under state law, or c) an exchange
offer where acquirer will hold at least 50% of the target company's sercurities upon completion of the transaction; (2) the acquisition be of a small company by a large company
(defined to not involve a change of more than 10%, for the issuer, on a pro forma combined
consolidated basis, giving effect to the transaction in question of gross sales, operating
revenues, net income, total assets and total shareholders' equity); (3) the transaction be
approved or recommended by both boards of directors (as of the date of effectiveness of the
registration statement); (4) the prospectus be delivered 20 days prior to the meeting date or
the date of vote consent or authorization (even if not solicited); and (5) the issuer has
furnished its latest annual report to security holders. Form S-15 specifically excluded investment companies from its use. See Securities Act Release No. 6232, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,647
(Sept. 2, 1980).
25. Securities Act Release No. 6235 presents the framework. See Securities Act Release
No. 6235, supra note 1. The three tiers pertain both to eligible issuers and types of information. The tiers of information are: "1) the information comprising the registration statement;
2) the information delivered to offerees; and 3) the information available on request." Report
of the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure to the Securities and Exchange Commission, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 425
(Nov. 3, 1977). The three issuer tiers are: (1) issuers widely followed by professional analysts; (2) issuers not widely followed but subject to '34 Act reporting requirements for over
three years; and (3) issuers subject to '34 Act reporting for less than three years. See Proposal of Comprehensive Revision to System for Registration of Securities Offerings, Securities
Act Release No. 6331/Exchange Act Release No. 18,007, 46 Fed. Reg. 41,902 (Aug. 18,
1981)[hereinafter Securities Act Release No. 6331/Exchange Act Release No. 18,007 or
Release 6331].
26. See Securities Act Release No. 6235, supra note 1.
27. The Commission divided the information into two types, issuer specific and transaction specific. Issuer specific information included information relating to the Company and its
performance such as description of business, discussion and analysis of management, and
financial statements. Transaction specific information relates to the transaction, such as use of
proceeds, terms of the particular security involved, underwriting arrangements and the like.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol20/iss3/4

10

Prozan and Fatale: Revisiting "Truth in Securities": The Use of the Efficient Capita

1992]

REVISITING "TRUTH IN SECURITIES"

The Commission explicitly adopted the ECMH in its refinement
of the registration process. 2 The Commission used certain factors to
determine when to apply the ECMH to particular issuers and allow
company-specific information to be incorporated by reference. These
factors include: (1) whether the issuer's securities fall into a category
that cause broker dealers to research and publish -reports on them;29
(2) the likelihood that the financial press would report on the issuer;30 and (3) the composition of the market for the security.31
These factors attempt to reduce reliance on the quality of the registrant and focus on the degree of marketplace dissemination of information about the issuer.
Through the process of integration, the Commission concluded
that "equivalency" existed between the information necessary for
decisions made in the initial distribution and trading markets.32 In
1982, the Commission settled on the current system.33 The present
system provides a uniform system of textual disclosure through Regu-

The Commission sought to reduce disclosure burdens relating to issuer specific information.
All transaction specific information needed to be disclosed in each registration statement.
Registration Statement and Prospectus Provisions, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.500-12 (1992) defines the
transaction specific information that is currently required.
28. For example, Securities Act Release No. 6235, supra note 1, states:
information is regularly being furnished to the market through periodic reports
under the Exchange Act. This information is evaluated by professional analysts and
other sophisticated users, is available to the financial press and is obtainable by
any other person who seeks it for free or at nominal cost. To the extent that the
market accordingly acts efficiently, and this information is reflected in the price of
the registrant's outstanding securities, there seems little need to reiterate tW information in a prospectus in the context of a distribution.
Id at 63,694. In addition, Securities Act Release No. 6331/Exchange Act Release No. 18,007,
supra note 25, states: "[p]roposed Form S-3 recognizes the applicability of the efficient market theory to the registration statement framework." Id at 41,904.
29. See Securities Act Release. No. 6331/Exchange Act Release No. 18,007, supra note
25, at 41,906. This is referred to, along with financial press reporting, as the "small firm
effect." See WILLIAM F. SHARPE, INVESTMENTS 404-07 (2d ed. 1985).
30. See Securities Act Release No. 6235, supra note 1, at 63,695. The SEC felt that the
financial press plays a vital role in the information process: "[t]his country has a uniquely
active and responsive financial press which facilitates the broad dissemination of highly timely
and material company oriented information to a vast readership." Id
31. See id (recognizing technical analysis by indicating that analysts also expend efforts
to analyze the markets in which a security trades as well as the fundamentals of the particular company involved).
32. See id at 63,694; see also Securities Act Release No. 6331/Exchange Act Release
No. 18,007, supra note 25, at 41,902. The equivalency theory led to the standardization of
the '33 and '34 Act reporting documents and the integrated disclosure system.
33. See Securities Act Release No. 6383/Exchange Act Release No. 18,524, supra note

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1992

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 4

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:687

lation S-K 34 and accounting through Regulation S-X,35 so that when
a particular '33 or '34 Act form calls for certain disclosure, consistent
disclosure appears among the forms.
C.

Technical Registration Requirements

The present system provides for three tiers of issuers, 3 each
having differing obligations in their '33 Act registration provisions.
The Commission recognized these three tiers through the promulgation of Forms S-3, S-2, and S-1 and the rescission of Forms S-7 and
S-16.37 This section of the Article reviews the application by the
Commission of the ECMH to these registration forms, as well as the
bases underlying this application.38
1. Form S-3
Form S-3 issuers provide minimal information in their Securities
Act registration statements. In designing this form, the Commission
sought to restrict its use to issuers who were focused upon by the
research branches of the brokerage houses. To be eligible to use Form
S-3, issuers must meet registrant and transactional requirements. The
registrant requirements, premised on the '34 Act reporting, are designed to ensure that the issuer has and will continue to provide appropriate information necessary for the stock to trade in an efficient
market. The registrant requirements are that the issuer: (1) a) has a
class of registered securities under § 12(b), b) has a class of equity
securities regitered under § 12(g), or c) is required to file reports

34. Adoption of Regulation S-K
began in
1977, Securities
Act Release
No. 5893/Exchange Act Release No. 14,806, 42 Fed. Reg. 65,554 (Dec. 30, 1977) (Items 12); continued in 1978, Securities Act Release No. 5949, 43 Fed. Reg. 34,407 (July 28, 1978)
(Items 3-6); through 1980, Securities Act Release No. 6231/Exchange Act Release No.
17,114, supra note 13, and Securities Act Release No. 6233/Exchange Act Release No.
17,116, supra note 13 (Items 7-12). It was substantially amended in Securities Act Release
No. 6383/Exchange Act Release No. 18,524, supra note 10 (adopting the integrated disclosure
system).
35. See Uniform Instructions as to Financial Statements-Regulation S-X, Securities Act
Release No. 6179/Exchange Act Release No. 16,499, 45 Fed. Reg. 5963 (Jan. 24, 1980)
(proposing changes to Regulation S-X) and Securities Act Release No. 6233/Exchange Act
Release No. 17,116, supra note 13 (adopting changes to Regulation S-X).
36. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying texL
37. See Securities Act Release No. 6383/Exchange Act Release No. 18,524, supra note
10.
38. See Securities Act Release No. 6235, supra note 1. The adopted system also
provided for a temporary shelf offering rule and a revision of the form for exchange offers.
See Securities Act Release No. 6383/Exchange Act Release No. 18,524, supra note 10.
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under § 15(d); (2) has been subject to §§ 12 or 15(d) and has filed
all §§ 13, 14 or 15(d) reports for 36 calendar months; (3) has been
timely in filing such reports over the previous 12 months; (4) has not
defaulted on a preferred stock dividend or sinking fund installment
subsequent to the most recently audited financial statements; and
(5) has not defaulted on borrowed money or on a long-term lease
subsequent to its most recently audited financial statements when such
defaults in the aggregate are material to the position of the registrant
and its subsidiaries.39
The transactional requirements include: (1) in the case of a primary equity offering by the registrant or an affiliate a) $150 million
in float, or b) $100 million in float and an annual trading volume of
3 million shares; (2) for primary debt and nonconvertible preferred
stock, a rating of "investment grade" by a nationally recognized rating
agency; and (3) for secondary offerings, that the securities be the
same class as securities that are exchange listed or NASDAQ quoted.
Float is defined as the aggregate market value of voting stock held
by non-affiliates.40 Because the Commission's most detailed analysis
of the ECILH was with respect to primary offerings, it is that analysis which is the focus of this article.41
For primary offerings for cash of other than investment grade
securities, the Commission used a $150 million float requirement as a
criterion and threshold level to show that the security traded in an

39. Securities Act Release No. 6331/Exchange Act Release No. 18,007, supra note 25,
at 41,905. These changes made the determination of Form S-3 eligibility easier, without
expanding the number of issuers eligible to use Form S-3. See infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.

Other requirements include that the registrant must be organized under the laws of the
United States, any State or Territory therein, or the District of Columbia, and have its
principal business operations in the U.S. or its territories. 17 C.F.R. § 239.26 (1976).
40. See Securities Act Release No. 6331/Exchange Act Release No. 18,007, supra note
25 at 41,906.
41. The SEC's analysis with respect to primary debt was minimal. It stated that "security ratings are also based on marketplace information about the registrant which is analagous
to the efficient market for widely followed equity securities. Moreover, security ratings issued
by nationally recognized statistical rating organizations are widely used and relied upon by
the marketplace." See Securities Act Release No. 6331/Exchange Act Release No. 18,007,
supra note 25, at 41,910.
As to secondary offerings, the SEC initially set an identical standard as that used for
primary equity offerings, but modified its stance in light of commentator criticism. Id. Commentators argued that such a standard would harm venture capital companies and issuer
affiliates seeking to sell issuer stock and that such a standard was unwarranted in light of the
fact that history with respect to Form S-16 revealed very little abuse as to secondary offerings. Id
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efficient market.42 This criterion seeks to ensure that appropriate industry research resources are devoted to the company.4 3 The Agency
reviewed criteria used by: (1) investment institutions in making research coverage decisions; (2) publishers and service providers in
making reporting decisions; and (3) market trading organizations in
making listing and delisting decisions.' The findings indicated float
to be a prominent factor in the decisions of investment institutions; a
negligible factor in reporting coverage decisions; and a primary measure of depth-of-market by market trading organizations." 5
The Commission examined the possible use of other factors as
measures of market interest. These elements included: (1) trading
volume; (2) market capitalization (value of all stock outstanding,
including stock held by affiliates); (3) number of shareholders;
(4) nimber of market makers; and (5) asset size and revenue.46 Although the study found trading volume to be a prominent criteria
used to make investment research decisions, it also added too much
uncertainty to an issuer's eligibility and operated against issuers
whose investors retained their investments.47 Similarly, market capitalization had a strong correlation to float but tended to include substantial amounts of stock held by affiliates, making float a better
indicator of market interest. 4' The number of shareholders simply
was not indicative of market interest because this criteria operated
against a company with smaller numbers of large shareholders. 49 The
number of market makers proved a good measure of interest in the
OTC, but not the exchanges. The float was a better indicator for all
markets.5" Finally, an earnings test was not indicative of market interest and was not used in making research coverage decisions.5"
Generally, each of these criteria were found to either: (1) "have no
relationship to the breadth of information dissemination in the, market"; or (2) be "so statistically related to float that the criterion would

42. Securities Act Release No. 6331/Exchange Act Release No. 18,007, supra note 25,
at 41,906.
43. Id
44. Id at 41,907.
45. Id
46. Id
47. Id
48. Id at 41,908.
49. Id
50. Id
51.

Id
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have had a largely duplicative effect as an eligibility standard."52
The primary objective in selecting a float level may have been
maintenance of the status quo. A threshold level of float needed to be
selected for a bright line determination of eligibility for issuers to use
Form S-3. The goal in selecting a threshold level was to assure that
companies using Form S-3 be "the focus of extensive ongoing monitoring and evaluation."53 Release 6331 first discussed a $50 million
float. The Commission estimated that this float level made almost
50% of NYSE and AMEX listed and NASDAQ quoted companies
(collectively hereinafter "listed companies") eligible for use of
Form S-3 (a total of 2400 eligible issuers at that time).,4 After noting generally that each of the major investment houses can only focus
their research energies on 300 to 500 companies, and that there is a
propensity for wide overlapping research, the Commission did not feel
comfortable with a $50 million float level.55 The Commission next
discussed a possible $250 million float requirement, and noted that
this would encompass about 22% of listed companies or
1,084 issuers. 56 The Commission found this level too restrictive but
failed to indicate whether 1084 companies could be supported by
industry research capabilities.
The $150 million float requirement selected meant that 30% of
listed companies (1485 entities) would be eligible to use Form S-3.57
No discussion was provided as to whether industry research ability
could support this many companies. Release 6331 extensively discussed the effect of a $150 million float requirement on issuers then
able to use Form S-16. It noted that only 1.4% of companies with a
float of less than $150 million used Form S-16 for primary equity
issues and proposed an alternate $100 million float, 3 million share
annual trading volume test which expanded the range of Form S-3
eligible companies to 32%.58
The Commission's rejection of a $50 million float level on the
basis of insufficient industry research capability was inconsistent with
its selection of a $150 million float level, since that selection was
without a public finding of ample industry research capability. The

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id at 41,907.
Id at 41,909.
Id
Id.
Id
Id
Id at 41,910.
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failure to make a finding of adequate research capability indicates that
other factors may have gone into the SEC's calculation. The proximity of the number of companies eligible to use the $150 million float
requirement with the number of companies using Form S-16 for primary equity offerings, and the extensive discussion of this similarity,
are indicators that the Commission's concern was maintenance of the
status quo.59 In addition, the fact that Release 6331 is inconclusive
on industry research capability and that it notes no complaints about
the then-existing system indicates that the Commission may have been
more restrictive than necessary in creating the top tier of issuers.
2. Form S-2
The Commission designed Form S-2 to be used by .former Form
S-16 eligible issuers not eligible to use Form S-3. 60 The distinguishing feature between Form S-2 and Form S-3 is the lack of a transactional requirement for Form S-2.6 t
Benefits of filing on Form S-2 include incorporation by reference
of '34 Act documents on file with the SEC up to the date of effectiveness, and the ability to satisfy the registrant related disclosure by
delivering a copy of the annual report along with the transaction specific information.
3. Form S-1
Issuers not eligible for use of Forms S-3 or S-2 must file on
Form S-1. 62 Form S-1 provides for minimal incorporation by reference, requiring that the complete informational package be in the
prospectus.
4. Conclusion
The SEC engaged in a 15-year process culminating in 1982,
intended in part to incorporate the ECM- in its registration forms.
This process, which has gone substantially unmodified since that time,

59. Similarly, in adopting its test for secondary offerings, the SEC relied substantially
on maintaining the results under Form S-16, with little consideration as to whether such
results were consistent with the ECMH. See supra note 41.
60. See Securities Act Release No. 6331/Exchange Act Release Act No. 18,007, supra
note 25.
61. IzL
62. Form S-1, 17 C.F.R. §239.11 (1992). Note that some issuers may be eligible to use
some of the other specialty forms in lieu of Form S-1, i.e., Form S-4 (business combinations)
and Form S-11 (real estate). These other forms are not central to the Commission's application of the ECMH to the '33 Act registration provisions.
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resulted in the present scheme, featuring Forms S-3, S-2, and S-1 for
domestic issuers.
One rationale for the process was the effect of technological
advances on the dissemination of securities information.6 3 These advances have continued since 1982 and suggest that more and more
issuers are likely to trade in an efficient market.'
III.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRAUD-ON-THE-M1ARKET THEORY

[Section] 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 may well be the most litigated
provisions in the federal securities laws .... We enter this virgin
territory cautiously. [These questions] arise in an area where glib
generalizations and unthinking abstractions are major occupational
hazards .....
In 1988, in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,' the Supreme Court reaffirmed reliance as an element of proof in a Rule 10b-5 action needed
to evidence the causal connection between a defendant's misrepresentation and a plaintiff's injury.67 A plurality of the Court adopted the
fraud-on-the-market ("FOTM") theory of reliance6 as one means of
meeting this requirement.69 This section discusses the development
of the FOTM theory in four parts. The first section discusses Basic

63. See Securities Act Release No. 6235, supra note 1.
64. See supra note 8.
65. SEC v. National Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969) (Marshall, J., discussing the
Court's first occasion to interpret Rule 10b-5).
66. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
67. Id. at 243.
68. The theory behind this presumption of reliance is clearly stated in Note, The Fraudon-the-Market Theory, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1143 (1982).
69. Justice Blackmun authored the opinion joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and
Stevens. Justice White filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by
Justice O'Connor. White and O'Connor dissented on the adoption of the fraud-on-the-market
theory. Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with Associate Justices Scalia and Kennedy, took no
part in the decision. The fraud-on-the-market theory thus rests on a slim 4-2 plurality of the
Court. On a number of previous occasions, the Court had declined to decide on the issue.
See Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti Corp., 817 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
959 (1988); Platsis v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 642 F. Supp. 1277, 1301 (W.D. Mich. 1986),
aff'd, 829 F.2d 13 (6th Cir. 1987), and cert. denied, 485 U.S. 962 (1988); Lipton v
Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d. 740 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985);
T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Okla. Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983); Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 458 U.S. 1107, vacated sub nom. Price Waterhouse v. Panzirer, 459 U.S. 1027
(1982); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
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and the procedural significance of the FOTM presumption. The second part summarizes the cases since Basic which have focused on the
efficient capital market question. The third segment discusses the
cases referenced in part two on a case-by-case basis. The fourth section concludes that the holdings in the FOTM cases have been too
expansive.
A.

Basic and the ProceduralImpact of the FOTM Presumption

The FOTM theory posits that where a security trades in an efficient market, purchasers and sellers may justifiably rely on the market
price of the security in making their determination of whether to buy
or sell, creating a rebuttable presumption of reliance.70 To invoke the
presumption, the investor must allege and prove that: (1) the defendant made public misrepresentations; (2) the misrepresentations were
material; (3) the shares were traded on an efficient market; (4) the
misrepresentations would induce a reasonable investor relying on the
misrepresentations to misjudge the value of the shares; and (5) the
plaintiff traded the shares between the time the misrepresentations
were made and the time the truth was revealed.7 A defendant may
rebut the presumption by: (1) disproving any of these five elements;
(2) showing that the misrepresentations did not lead to a distortion of
price; or (3) showing that an, individual plaintiff traded or would have
traded despite knowledge of the false statements.7 2
Basic involved a motion to certify a class.73 The FOTM presumption was of practical significance because absent the presumption, individual class members would have had to prove direct reliance to proceed with their 10b-5 claims. In this event, each plaintiff's

70. See generally Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, supra note 68.
71. Basic, 485 US. at 248 n.27. The Court noted elements (2) and (4) may sometimes
collapse into each other. Basic noted as to the facts before it: "The Court of Appeals found
that petitioners 'made public, material misrepresentations and [respondents] sold Basic stock in
an impersonal efficient market. Thus the class, as defined by the district court, has established the threshold facts for proving their loss.'" Id.
72. Id
73. Post-Basic cases focusing on class certification motions include: Tapken v. Brown,
96,805 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 1992); In re AmeriFirst See. Litig.,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,419 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 1991); In re MDC Holdings Sec.
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
Litig., 754 F. Supp. 785 (S.D. Cal. 1990); In re Laser Arms Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 475
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); Guenther v. Pacific Telecom, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 333 (D. Or. 1988); Epstein
v. American Reserve Corp., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3382 (N.D. Il1. 1988); Harman v.
Lyphomed, Inc., 122 F.R.D. 522 (N.D. I11.1988); Garfinkel v. Memory Metals, Inc., 695 F.
Supp. 1397 (D. Conn. 1988).
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claim would have involved individual issues of fact and law, thus
preventing class certification.74 Denial of class certification significantly increases costs to each plaintiff resulting from the loss of the
economies of scale provided by the class action vehicle.75
Conversely, invoking the FOTM presumption greatly increases
the risk of loss to the defendant. Basic's statement that the presumption may not be rebutted at the class certification stage, but only at
trial,76 greatly enhances this risk because the vast majority of lOb-5
actions settle pre-trial." Thus, a "ruling for or against the class in

74. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) and (b)(3); see also Basic, 485 U.S. at 242 ("Requiring proof of individualized reliance from each member of the proposed plaintiff class effectively would have prevented respondents from proceeding with a class action, since individual
issues then would have overwhelmed the common ones."); cf. Garfinkel, 695 F. Supp. at
1403 n.13 (a determination that the FOTM presumption is not warrant-d will not necessarily
defeat class certification); Laser Arms, 794 F. Supp. at 495 (same); AmeriFirst, Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) at 91,821-24 (same); MDC Holdings, 754 F. Supp. at 806-07 (same); Guenther,
123 F.R.D. at 337-38, 339 (same).
75. In addition, proof of direct reliance may be more difficult. See Basic, 485 U.S. at
245; see also Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1292 n.49 (D.N.J. 1989) ("It is noted
if a company trades in an efficient market, plaintiffs would be relieved of substantial discovery and proof burdens concerning direct reliance-which could add months of trial preparation
to this dispute.").
76. The Court observed:
We note there may be a certain incongruity between the assumption that Basic
shares are traded on a well-developed, efficient and information-hungry market, and
the allegation that such a market could remain misinformed, and its valuation of
Basic shares depressed, for 14 months, on the basis of the three public statements.
Proof of that sort is a matter for trial, throughout which the District Court retains
the authority to amend the certification order as may be appropriate.
Basic, 485 U.S. at 249 n.29 (emphasis added).
77. See William Tucker, Shakedown?, FORBES, Aug. 19, 1991, at 98. The article states
that over 98% of these cases settle. Further, at any given time 500 to 700 Rule 101-5
actions are pending. Approximately 30% of the total costs go to attorney's fees, with insurance companies picking up the bulk of all of the litigation costs. High premiums paid for
this insurance burdens companies and depletes funds for dividends to shareholders. See also
Michael Selz, Lawsuits Often Follow When Small Firms Go Public, WALL ST. J.,Jan. 13,
1992, at B2 (stating that 614 securities class action suits were filed in 1990 and 1991, more
than the previous five years combined, and that more than 95% of such suits settle).
An illustrative case is Harman v. Lyphomed, Inc., 945 F.2d 969 (7th Cir. 1991).
Harman involved the attorneys' fees and expenses to be awarded subsequent to the settlement
of a FOTM action. The opinion certifying the plaintiffs' class at an earlier procedural juncture is discussed in Part C of this section. Harman reveals that the month after the class was
certified "substantial settlement negotiations" began. Id at 971. Shortly thereafter, a $10.4
million settlement was agreed to and approved by the district court, with plaintiffs' counsel
awarded $1,071,277 or about 10.3%. Counsel had requested $3,128,900 or about 30.1%.
Counsel initiated Harman to increase their take of the settlement fund. The court agreed with
some of counsel's claims and vacated and remanded the district court's ruling for recalculation.
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practice often determines the fate of the [FOTM] case."78
The FOTM cases not involving a class certification motion generally involve either a motion to dismiss on the pleadings under
F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), 79 or a motion to dismiss for failure to plead a
claim with particularity under F.R.C.P. 9(b)."° Counsel in these cases
often argue that the plaintiffs may not proceed with their FOTM
claim either because: (1) they have not sufficiently alleged or proved
the existence of an efficient capital market, or (2) the market is in
fact not efficient. Resolution of these issues at this stage is as procedurally significant as at the class certification stage.81
B. In Summary: The Efficient Capital Market Cases Post-Basic
While Basic states that an efficient market must be alleged and
proved for the FOTM presumption to apply, it does not define the
term.82 Moreover, neither the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion
affirmed in Basic, 3 nor other cases relied upon by the Supreme
Court,84 define the term "efficient market." For example, in Levinson
78. Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1292 (D.N.J. 1989) (quoting 4 ALAN R.
BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD § 8.6
(1988)).
79. See, e.g., In re Keegan Management Co. Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,275 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 1991); Greenberg v. Boettcher & Co., 755 F. Supp. 776 (N.D.
Il.1991); Stinson v. Van Valley Dev. Corp., 714 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1989), aft'd, 897
F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1990); Hurley v. FDIC, 719 F. Supp. 27 (D. Mass. 1989); Cammer v.
Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989).
96,836
80. See, e.g., In re Taxable Municipal Bonds Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,275 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10,
(E.D. La. June 30, 1992); Keegan, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96, 039 (D.D.C.
1991); In re Newbridge Networks Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
June 18, 1991); Steiner v. Southmark Corp., 734 F. Supp. 269 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
81. See generally Canmner, 711 F. Supp. at 1287-93.
82. See Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1120 (5th Cir. 1988), vacated on
other grounds sub nom. Fryar v. Abell, 492 U.S. 914 (1989) (Basic "announced its support
for a . . . largely undefined version of the [FOTM presumption of reliance [and] essentially
allows each of the circuits to develop its own fraud on the market rules"); Steiner, 734 F.
Supp. at 277 ('Basic did not define the standards to be applied in fraud on the market cases.").
83. Levinson v. Basic, Inc., 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1986).
84. Basic relied most heavily on Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154 (3d Cir. 1986); In re
LTV Securities Litigation, 88 F.R.D. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1980); and the seminal case of Blackie
v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976); see also Basic,
485 U.S. at 247 n.25 (citing additional cases for support).
Peil and Blackie, like many of the early FOTM cases, do not speak specifically of an
"efficient market." Their analyses, however, make clear that they rely on this concept. For
example, Peil states: The 'fraud on the market' theory rests on the assumption that there is
nearly a perfect market in information, and that the market price of a stock reacts to and
reflects the available information. While this presumption is plausible in developed markets, it
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v. Basic, Inc., the Sixth Circuit concluded that the stock in question
was traded on an efficient market. 5 Therefore, one of the elements
required for application of the FOTM presumption was met.16 However, in a subsequent opinion the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that it
did not define in its Basic opinion the qualities that characterize an
efficient market, since that was not an issue in the case. 8'
The only fact recited in the Sixth Circuit's opinion which supports the conclusion that Basic's stock traded in an efficient market is
that the stock traded on the NYSE.8 8 The Supreme Court's affir-

mance of this opinion does not provide any additional relevant facts.
Therefore, Basic suggests that stocks traded on the NYSE per se
trade in an efficient capital market.8 9
Basic's reliance on FOTM cases involving securities traded on
the AMEX likewise suggests that AMEX securities per se trade in an
efficient capital market. For example, Basic quoted extensively from
Peil v. Speiser, which concluded that the FOTM presumption was
applicable to a security traded on the AMEX without discussing the
characteristics of the market.' ° Cases decided subsequent to Basic
generally assume that securities traded on the NYSE or AMEX trade
in an efficient market.9 ' Consistent with this view, very few of these
may not be in the case of a newly issued stock. As the case at bar involves a widely traded
and established stock, we need not consider whether or not we would apply the 'fraud on
the market' theory in other instances." Peil, 806 F.2d at 1161 n.10.
85. 786 F.2d at 750-51.
86. Id. at 751.
87. Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 198 (6th Cir. 1990).
88. See Basic, 786 F.2d at 743.
89. This proposition is supported by Basic's reliance on In re LTV Securities Litigation,
88 F.R.D. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1080); and Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976). In LTV, the court stated with reference to the stock in question,
"the prices of stocks of larger corporations, such as those listed on the NYSE, seem especially efficient" 88 F.R.D. at 144. Blackie similarly involved a stock traded on the NYSE and
that case applied the FOTM presumption with little analysis of the market in question.
90. See Peil, 806 F.2d at 1161 n.10 (quoted supra note 84). Basic's reliance on Peil
was so substantial that some subsequent cases refer to a joint Basic/Peil rule. See, e.g.,
Stinson v. Van Valley Dev. Corp., 714 F. Supp. 132, 134 n.4, 135-37 (E.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd,
897 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1990); Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1285 (D.N.J. 1989).
Basic also relied on another AMEX case, Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. granted sub nom. Price Waterhouse v. Panzirer, 458 U.S. 1105, vacated and complaint
dismissed, 459 U.S. 1027 (1982). See Basic, 485 U.S. at 247 n.25.
On March 5, 1992, the SEC approved lower financial listing standards for certain
AMEX stocks. See William Power & Sandra Block, AMEX's New Home for "Start-Ups"
Wins SEC Nod, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 1992, at C1. Because the change is intended to lure
NASDAQ stocks to the AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks are generally deemed by the courts to
trade in an efficient market, the change should not affect case law.
91. See, e.g., Freeman, 915 F.2d at 199 ("[S]ecurities traded in national secondary

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1992

21

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 4

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:687

cases involve claims that securities traded on either the NYSE or
AMEX do not trade in an efficient capital market. 92
Most of the recent cases focusing on the efficient capital market
question involve either securities traded OTC93 or revenue bonds.94
Where the cases involve revenue bonds, the courts find that the securities do not trade on an efficient capital market.95 On the other

markets such as the New York Stock Exchange, as was the case in Levinson, are well suited
for application of the fraud on the market theory."); see also Tapken v. Brown, Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 96,805, at 93,168-69 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 1992); In re MDC Holdings Sec.
Litig., 754 F. Supp. 785, 805 (S.D. Cal 1990); Steiner v. Southmark Corp., 734 F. Supp.
269, 277 (N.D. Tex. 1990); Hurley v. FDIC, 719 F. Supp. 27, 33 (D. Mass. 1989); Harman
v. Lyphomed, Inc., 122 F.R.D. 522, 525 (N.D. Il1. 1988). But see Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at
1281 (some companies listed on national stock exchanges are relatively unknown and trade
there only because they meet eligibility requirements).
92. One case where such a claim was made as to securities traded on the NYSE is
94,121 (C.D. Cal.
A & J Deutscher Family Fund v. Bullard, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
Nov. 29, 1988). In light of semantical nuances by defendant's and plaintiff's experts (securities not traded in an efficient market versus market activity of the stock "not inconsistent"
with market efficiency), the court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment on
this point. See infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
93. See, e.g., In re AmeriFirst Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,419 (S.D. Fla.
96,039
Aug. 7, 1991); In re Newbridge Networks Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
(D.D.C. June 18, 1991); MDC Holdings, 754 F. Supp. 785; Cammer, 711 F. Supji. 1264
(D.N.J. 1989); In re Laser Arms Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Hurley, 719
F. Supp. 27; Harman, 122 F.R.D. 522; Garfinkel v. Memory Metals, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 1397
(D. Conn. 1988); Epstein v. American Reserve Corp., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3382 (N.D. Ill.
1988); Guenther v Pacific Telecom, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 333 (D. Or. 1988).
96,836
94. See, e.g., In re Taxable Municipal Bonds Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
(E.D. La. June 30, 1992); In re Keegan Management Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,275 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 1991); Greenberg v. Boetteher & Co., 755 F. Supp. 776 (N.D.
Il. 1991); Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 1552 (D. Colo.
1991); Freeman, 915 F.2d 193; In re Bexar County Health Facility Dev. Corp. Sec. Litig.,
130 F.R.D. 602 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Stinsop v. Van Valley Dev. Corp., 714 F. Supp. 132 (E.D.
Pa. 1989), aft'd, 897 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1990); Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104
(5th Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Fryar v. Abell, 492 U.S. 914 (1989).
95. See supra note 94 for cases involving a motion to dismiss the FOTM claim
which-with the exception of Taxable Municipal Bonds-resulted in dismissal.
All the cases referenced in note 94, except Taxable Municipal Bonds and Greenberg,
involved newly-issued bonds traded mainly on a primary market. Because in these cases price
is set primarily by the underwriter and offeror, the probability is diminished that price can
reasonably be relied on as an accurate reflection of the bonds' value. See Freeman, 915 F.2d
at 199. Several cases, including Bank of Denver, Stinson, Bexar and Abell have recognized a
different presumption of reliance sometimes applicable in these situations commonly known as
the "fraud created the market theory." See Bank of Denver, 763 F. Supp. at 1555; Stinson,
714 F. Supp. at 366, Bexar, 130 F.R.D. at 610; Abell, 858 F.2d at 1121; see also Ross v.
Bank South, N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 729 (11th Cir. 1989) (en bane), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 905
(1990); T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Okla. Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330,
1333 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462
(5th Cir. 1981) (en bane), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983). Under this theory investors are
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hand, where the cases involve OTC securities, they generally hold
either that the securities do trade in an efficient capital market warranting application of the FOTM theory, or alternatively, that the
issue is to be decided at trial.9 As previously mentioned, using either approach to OTC securities results in the same outcome."

presumed to rely not on the integrity of the market price, but on the integrity of the market
itself (i.e., that the nexus between the defendant's fraud and the plaintiff's injury is not established by alleging and proving that the fraud affected the market price, but rather by
alleging and proving that the securities could not have been marketed at any price). Because
the fraud-created-the-market analysis is not premised upon the existence of a security trading
within a capital market, efficient or not, it is outside the scope of this article.
96. The following cases take the former approach: AmeriFirst, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,419 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 1991); Hurley, 719 F. Supp. 27; Cammer, 711 F. Supp. 1264;
and Harman, 122 F.R.D. 522. But see Epstein, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3382 (FOTM claim
dismissed because securities trading in the OTC market do not trade in an efficient market).
The latter approach is represented by Laser Arms, 794 F. Supp. 475; Garfinkel, 695 F. Supp.
1397; and Guenther, 123 F.R.D. 333; see also Taxable Municipal Bonds, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH)
96,836, at 93,334 (E.D. La. June 30, 1992) (plaintiffs' allegations that bonds traded
on secondary market suggest the "possibility" of an efficient market; defendants' 12(b)(6)
motion denied); Keegan, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,275, at 91,479 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10,
1991) (court invokes FOTM presumption; plaintiff must prove that the market was "truly"
efficient at the summary judgment stage or at trial); Newbridge, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,039, at 90,232 (D.D.C. June 18, 1991) (facts and allegations sufficient to raise substantial
questions whether market was efficient; issue merited further factual development and therefore survived a motion to dismiss); A & J Deutscher Family Fund, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,121, at 91,274 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 1988) (court refuses to dismiss FOTM claim where
subject securities trade on NYSE; question of the market's efficiency to be determined at
trial).
MDC Holdings discusses the different approaches. 754 F. Supp. at 804-05; see also
Cammer 711 F. Supp. at 1292 n.50 (noting that its approach is different from that utilized in
Garfinkel). Basic suggests that proof warranting application of the FOTM presumption must
be presented at the class certification stage. See supra note 76 and the text accompanying
notes 71-78. The cases that postpone the determination rely on the doctrine stated by the
United States Supreme Court in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974),
that the merits of an action are not to be examined at the class certification stage. See
Garfinkel, 695 F. Supp. at 1403; Guenther, 123 F.R.D. at 340; see also In re Data Access
Sys. Sec. Litig., 103 F.R.D. 130, 139-40 (D.NJ. 1984).
97. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text. Two recent OTC cases illustrate the
primary difference between OTC cases and revenue bond cases. See AmeriFirst, Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 96,419 (S.D. Fla. August 7, 1991); Newbridge, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,036 (D.D.C. June 18, 1991). Both AmeriFirst and Newbridge involved class periods
which commenced with the issuer's initial public offering. In both AmeriFirst and Newbridge,
the courts allowed the FOTM claims to go forward; however, both courts indicated that from
the time of the IPO to an undetermined time thereafter the market was by definition primary
and therefore inefficient. See AmeriFirst, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,419, at 91,821 (so
ruling); Newbridge, Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,036, at 90,232 (indicating that it accepted
this argument, but deferring on a ruling); see also Gruber v. Price Waterhouse, Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 96,581 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 1991) (the FOTM theory does not apply to IPOs).
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Survey: The Efficient Capital Market Cases Post-Basic

1. The First Circuit: Hurley v. FDIC
In Hurley v. FDIC,9" the Massachusetts District Court considered whether the OTC stock of First Service Bank for Savings ("First
Service") traded in an efficient market, which would enable plaintiffs
to use the FOTM presumption. The procedural context was a F.R.C.P.
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and a question of first impression in the
Circuit."9 Defendants argued that OTC stocks per se do not trade in
an efficient market. During the class period, First Service issued
5 million shares and the stock traded actively with 19.3 million
shares sold. Based on these facts, the court concluded that there was
"a sufficient showing of efficiency at this early stage of the litigation
to invoke the fraud-on-the-market theory as a substitute for pleading
actual reliance. ' lo°
2. The Second Circuit: Garfinkel v. Memory Metals, Inc.
In Garfinkel v. Memory Metals, Inc.,' the plaintiffs sought
class certification for Rule 10b-5 violations with respect to the common stock of Memory Metals, Inc. The proposed class period was
February 12, 1986 to September 26, 1986. The plaintiffs alleged that
Memory Metals was publicly traded on the NASDAQ Supplemental
OTC market during 1986."°2 In addition, the plaintiffs demonstrated
that Memory Metals had approximately 614 shareholders of record on

98. 719 F. Supp. 27 (D. Mass. 1989).
99. Id at 34.
100. Id Hurley stated:
This court holds that the principles which undergird applying the fraud on the
market theory to stock traded on the NYSE or [AMEX] are equally valid with
respect to OTC transactions. Where the stock is traded is not the crucial issue. The
important question is whether the stock is traded in a market that is efficient - one
that obtains material information about a company and accurately reflects that information in the price of the stock.
1988),
Id at 33. The court also cited Harman v. Lyphomed, Inc., 122 F.R.D. 522 (N.D. Ill.
for the proposition: "While some over-the-counter stocks no doubt trade in a less developed
market than some New York Stock Exchange issues, the inquiry in an individual case remains the development of the market for that stock, and not the location where the stock
trades." Hurley, 719 F. Supp. at 33-34 (citing Harman, 122 F.R.D. at 525).
At trial, the Massachusetts district court imposed liability under the FOTM theory
without an analysis of the pertinent market. See Hurley v. FDIC, CA No. 88-1940-T (D.
Mass. Aug. 27, 1992).
101. 695 F. Supp. 1397 (D. Conn. 1988).
102. Id at 1399.
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December 17, 1986 and that nearly 18 million shares were outstanding and traded during the proposed class period."0 3 The defendants
countered that market efficiency had not been properly proved and
indeed that the security did not trade in an efficient market." 4 The
court deferred on the factual determination of market efficiency as an
issue related to the merits of the case to be decided at trial.105 The
decision states, "For purposes of class certification, the plaintiffs' allegation that an 'efficient' market was operating ... is sufficient.""t
3.

The Third Circuit: Cammer v. Bloom, Stinson v. Van
Valley Development Corp.
In the case of Cammer v. Bloom, t°7 the New Jersey district
court provided the most detailed inquiry to date into the judicial definition of an efficient capital market. The court addressed the issue of
whether the NASDAQ-NMS quoted common stock of Coated Sales,
Inc. traded on an efficient market during the class period."' The
procedural posture was a motion to dismiss treated under the summary judgment standard.
The court rejected the idea that the OTC markets are inefficient
per se and that securities trading in these markets cannot be trading
in an efficient market.1°9 Next, the court spumed the idea that only

103. Id at 1401.
104. Il at 1403.
105. See supra note 96.
106. Garfinkel, 695 F. Supp. at 1403; see also In re Laser Arms Corp. Sec. Litig., 794
F. Supp. 745 (whether a penny stock of an alleged fictitious corporation-listed on the
National Quotations Bureau pink sheets-traded in an efficient market is a question of fact to
be determined at trial).
107. 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989).
108. The court noted that in FOTM cases, "Peil and Basic unambiguously require a
plaintiff to allege . . . that the shares were traded on an efficient market."' Id at 1285. NMS
stocks are stocks which trade on NASDAQ's premier "National Market System"-a grouping
of the largest and most widely followed OTC stocks. Id. at 1283 [hereinafter NASDAQNMS].
109. The court held:
It would be illogical to apply a presumption of reliance merely because a security
is traded within a certain "whole market,' without considering the trading characteristics of the individual stock itself. Some well-followed stocks, such as Apple
Computer and MCI Telecommunications, have chosen to trade in the over-the-counter market rather than on a national exchange. On the other hand, some companies
listed on national stock exchanges are relatively unknown and trade there only
because they meet the eligibility requirements. While the location of where a stock
trades might be relevant, it is not dispositive of whether the "current price reflects
all available information."
Id at 1281.
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Form S-3 eligible issuers could be considered to be trading in an
efficient market. t° In promoting this argument, the defendants noted
Harman v. Lyphomed, Inc., which held that issuers eligible to use
Form S-3 traded in an efficient market.1 12 Cammer concluded that a
finding of Form S-3 eligibility, while important, was not the exclusive
determinant of whether a security trades in an efficient market. To
reveal the inequity in this proposed rule, it was noted that during the
class period Coated Sales met all of the Form S-3 eligibility requirements except for the duty to file '34 Act reports for 36 months."'
Cammer quoted extensively from the SEC Releases adopting
Form S-3 which analyzed the question of when a market is efficient." 4 However, in lieu of utilizing the SEC tests, Cammer devised its own. The court premised its decision on the notion that it is
"not logical to draw bright line tests-such as whether a company is
listed on a national exchange or is entitled to register securities on
SEC Form S-3-to assist fact finders in determining whether a stock
trades in an 'open and efficient market."' 5 The court concocted its
own rule despite noting that "it has been said that federal courts lack
the expertise to evaluate securities markets and formulate substantive
rules of law based on such evaluation and that Congress is better
equipped for such tasks."" 6 Cammer acknowledged that while a na-

110. Id at 1284-85.
111, 122 F.R.D. 522 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
112. Id at 525.
113. Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1284 n.32. Cammer indicated the importance of the three
year reporting requirement to the SEC in administering the integrated disclosure system, but
not in determining whether a security trades in an efficient capital market. For purposes of
proving that an issuer was traded in an efficient capital market, the court stated that "it
would be helpful to allege that the Company was entitled to file an S-3 Registration Statement in connection with public offerings, or if ineligible, such ineligibility was only because
of timing features rather than because the minimum stock requirements set forth in the
instructions to Form S-3 were not met." Id at 1287. Cammer misconstrued some of the
SEC's other technical requirements. The case states that the "'public float' aspect of the
Form S-3 requirements ensures that enough investors have in fact read the previously filed
document," and that the number of shareholders and market capitalization of an issuer are
facts which imply market efficiency. Id at 1285. In fact, the SEC adopted a float requirement to ensure that a particular security was the subject of professional research and analysis.
Moreover, the SEC rejected the two criteria-number of shareholders and market capitalization-in favor of float and annual trading volume in determining the best indicators of
market efficiency. These slight mistakes in technical interpretations are indicative of why the
SEC should be given substantial deference in this area.
114. Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1284-85.
115. Id at 1287.
116. Id at 1283 (noting White's dissent in Basic).
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tional stock exchange listing does not imply an efficient market, more
often than not the
relevant characteristics would be associated with
17
companies.
such
The Cammer factors are: (1) average weekly trading volume
during the class period in excess of a certain number of shares; (2) a
significant number of analysts following the company; (3) numerous
market makers; (4) the Form S-3 factors (i.e., number of shareholders
and market capitalization); and (5) empirical facts showing a causal
link between unexpected corporate events or financial releases and an
immediate response in the stock price.118 Using these factors, the
court analyzed information provided to it and permitted the action to
go forward.119
Stinson v. Van Valley Development Corp.120 used the Cammer
analysis and factors in dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint under
F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). The claim related to newly issued revenue bonds.
The plaintiffs' strongest claims of an efficient market rested on their
assertion that the bonds were sold throughout the United States in a
diverse public market. The court premised the dismissal on the
plaintiffs' failure to allege any facts that the bonds were traded on a
secondary market with a relatively high level of trading activity and
for which trading information, such as price and volume, was readily
available.121

117. Id at 1281 n.26.
118. Id at 1286-87.
119. Inter alia, the following facts provided by plaintiffs were relevant and operative
during the class period: (1) Coated Sales stock was traded in an impersonal market; (2) 19
million shares of Coated Sales stock were outstanding, and the public float was 12 to 13
million shares; (3) Coated Sales stock was held by 1200 shareholders of record and thousands of beneficial owners; (4) 44 million shares of Coated Sales stock were traded, representing an average weekly trading volume of 750,000 shares; (5) investors had ready access
to price quotations for Coated Sales stock through the daily financial press, and to current
quotations through their brokers; (6) Coated Sales had 11 market makers who issued competing price quotations on the NASDAQ system; (7) at least 15 research reports on the company were issued by analysts during the class period; (8) Coated Sales utilized the services of
a public relations firm and issued numerous press releases concerning its business operations;
and (9) the market for Coated Sales stock reacted quickly and dramatically to key events at
issue in the lawsuit. Id at 1283 n.30.
120. 714 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd, 897 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1990).
121. Id at 137. See In re Bexar County Health Facility Dev. Corp. Sec. Litig., 130
F.R.D. 602 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (dismissal appropriate as to newly issued municipal revenue
bonds-Cammer factors set forth).
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4. The Fifth Circuit: Abell v. Potomac Insurance Co., Steiner v.
Southmark Corp., and In re Newbridge Networks Securities
Litigation
In Abell v. Potomac Insurance Co.,' 22 the Fifth Circuit viewed
newly issued revenue bonds in the context of a denial of a judgment
n.o.v. A small secondary market, exploited by brokers, had developed
for the bonds during the period in question."' 3 Abell held that the
FOTM presumption is available only "where the subject securities
were traded actively in large markets."' 24 Because the market for
the bonds was not an active, efficient secondary market capable of
accurately measuring the value of the bonds, the theory did not apt
ply. 1.
Abell was followed by a district court decision in Steiner v.
Southmark Corp.126 which analyzed defendants' securities, including
debt securities, under F.R.C.P. 9(b). Steiner stated that the applicable
test was whether the "subject securities traded actively in large markets.' 27 While referring to virtually no facts to show that this test
the securiwas met, 28 Steiner stated that there was no dispute that
29
ties in question were traded actively in large markets.
More recently, in In re Newbridge Networks Securities Litigation, 3 the district court held that the plaintiff's complaint contained
sufficient facts and allegations to survive a motion to dismiss.' In
that case, the focus was the OTC common stock of Newbridge Networks Corporation ("Newbridge"). The court summarily rejected an

122. 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Fryar v. Abell,
492 U.S. 914 (1989).
123. Id. at 1121.
124. Id, at 1122. The court did note a second possible test, but that test is more commonly viewed separately as the fraud created the market theory. Id See supra note 95.
125. Id
126. 734 F. Supp. 269 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
127. d at 277.
128. The opinion notes merely that the debt securities were traded on an "open market."
Id In fact, Southmark's stock traded on the NYSE during the period in question and seven
of its nine debt issuances traded on that same exchange. Two of the debt issuances did not
trade at all.
129. Icd
130. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,039 (D.D.C. June 18, 1991).
131. In particular, plaintiff's complaint stated that there were over 33 million shares
outstanding during the class period, that 3,750,000 shares were sold pursuant to the IPO, that
1.2 million shares were traded on one day during the class period, and that the stock price
reacted quickly to information about the company. Id at 90,232.
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argument that the FOTM theory was unavailable because the OTC
market was per se inefficient; however, the court indicated that the
market may not have been efficient from the time of Newbridge's
IPO to an undetermined time thereafter."
5. The Sixth Circuit: Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath
In Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath,33 the Sixth Circuit addressed the issue of whether FOTM claims as to newly issued municipal bonds should have been dismissed by the district court. The court
relied upon the Cammer factors in holding that such bonds do not
trade in an efficient market as a matter of law."3 Specifically, the
court noted that the market price for these bonds is not set by active
trading but by negotiation between the underwriter and the offeror.35 The court stated that securities traded on national secondary
exchanges are well suited to the theory because the high level of
trading activity ensures that all knowable public information is subsumed into the market price. 36
6. The Seventh Circuit: Harman v. Lyphomed, Inc., Greenberg
v. Boettcher & Co., and Epstein v. American Reserve Corp.
While the Seventh Circuit has not yet ruled on the FOTM issue,
several district courts within the Circuit have. 37 In Harman v.
Lyphomed, Inc., 38 the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on a
motion for class certification where the claim involved an OTC stock,
Lyphomed, Inc. The court found that the plaintiffs adequately pleaded
that Lymphomed traded in an efficient market during the proposed
class period by alleging that: (1) its average weekly trading volume
during the class period was in excess of one million shares; (2) it

132. Id The court's postponement of the resolution of the efficient capital market question may have been influenced by the fact that a motion for class certification was forthcoming; see also In re Taxable Municipal Bonds Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,836 (E.D.
La. June 30, 1992) (12(b)(6) motion denied merely because plaintiffs alleged that the subject
bonds traded in a secondary market created by defendants).
133. 915 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1990).
134. Id at 199.
135. Id
136. Id
137. See Greenberg v. Boettcher Co., 755 F. Supp. 776, 781 (N.D. Ill. 1991) ("The
Seventh Circuit has not yet articulated a standard for determining the applicability of the
fraud on the market theory."); Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 740 F. Supp. 572, 580
(E.D. Wis. 1990) ("The Seventh Circuit . . . has not defined the exact type of market in
which it is certain that the market price reflects publicly available information.").
138. 122 F.R.D. 522 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
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was followed by over a dozen analysts; (3) it had numerous market
makers; and (4) it was eligible for the use of Form S-3.1 39 The
court in Harman placed greater weight on Form S-3 eligibility than
did the court in Cammer, suggesting it to be the most important
factor.y Like in Cammer, the court in Harman dismissed the contrading in the OTC market do not trade in an
tention that securities
4
efficient market.1 '
The case of Greenberg v. Boettcher & Co.142 focused on the
requirement established in Cammer, Harman and Stinson that use of
the FOTM theory "clearly requires a plaintiff to specifically plead
facts that show a well-developed, efficient market." 143 The securities
in the case were municipal bonds held by investors on a date approximately seven years after initial issuance. The allegations included
insufficient disclosure about the securities' redemption provisions and
the inability of investors to adequately value the bonds in light of
misstatements and omissions. The court found the plaintiff's pleading
on the efficient market question conclusory and dismissed the action
pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).' 4
Epstein v. American Reserve Corp.'45 involved the stock and
debentures of American Reserve Corp. traded in the OTC market between the period December 1, 1974 and March 12, 1979.146 The

139. litat 525.
140. Id at 525. Harman stated: "[Tihe SEC established reporting requirements for
Lyphomed on the premise that the stock traded in an open and efficient market.- Id at 525
n.l.
141. Id at 525. Harman stated:
[N]othing in the theory limits its application to stocks which trade on a particular
exchange. Rather, the question is always whether the stock trades in an efficient
market, i.e. one in which material information on the company is widely available
and accurately reflected in the value of the stock . . . .While some over-the-counter stocks no doubt trade in a less developed market than some New York Stock
Exchange issues, the inquiry in an individual case remains the development of the
market for that stock, and not the location where the stock trades.
Id
142. 755 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Ill.
1991).
143. Id at 782.
144. Id at 782-83. The factual allegations included the assertion that municipal bonds
generally trade in an efficient market and that a few professional investors had read the
portions of the prospectus involving the controversial disclosure. Because the court also found
the action time-barred, it is unclear whether it would have allowed plaintiff to amend her
complaint but for this finding.
145. 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3382 (N.D. II. Apr. 20, 1988).
146. During 1979, the securities traded on the NASDAQ-NMS. Prior to that, the NMS
listing of securities did not exist.
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case involved a motion for class certification and the issue was
whether the FOTM presumption applied so as to prevent individual
issues of reliance from predominating at trial. 47 Epstein concluded
that securities trading in the OTC market per se do not trade in an
efficient market and that therefore the class could not be certified.148
7.

The Ninth Circuit: Guenther v. Pacific Telecom, Inc., In re
MDC Holdings Securities Litigation, In re Keegan Management Co. Securities Litigation, and A & J Deutscher Family
Fund v. Bullard
The Ninth Circuit has yet to address the question of when a
market is efficient. 14 However, several district court cases in that
circuit have resolved the issue by using different approaches.
In Guenther v. Pacific Telecom, Inc., 50 the plaintiffs sought
class certification for FOTM claims relating to the stock of American
Network, Inc. traded from January 1984 through December 1986.
Plaintiffs made no factual allegations that the stock was traded on an
efficient market.' 5' Defendants argued that this failure meant that
the motion must fail and further noted that the stock was not quoted
on the NASDAQ until halfway through the class period, was delisted
shortly after the period, and was not quoted on the NASDAQ-NMS
until after the close of the class period." 2 The court stated that it
could not conclude on the record whether the plaintiffs would be successful. Because the court was unwilling to closely scrutinize the
merits of the action at the class certification stage, it refused to deny
class certification to the plaintiffs. 5 3

147. See supra notes 73-74 and the accompanying text.
148. Epstein, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3382. Epstein relied on In re Data Access Systems
Securities Litigation, 103 F.R.D. 130 (D.N.J. 1984), which viewed the stock of Data Access
Systems, Inc. ("Data") for the class period October 31, 1978 - August 24, 1981. For approximately the first six months of this class period, the Data stock traded OTC (it then traded
on the AMEX). The court stated in dicta that a stock trading on the OTC market "may not"
constitute the market necessary for the application of the FOTM theory. See id at 138. This
was dicta in the case, in part because the court was unwilling to scrutinize the merits of the
action at the class certification stage. See id at 139-40.
149. See In re MDC Holdings Sec. Litig., 754 F. Supp. 785, 804 (S.D. Cal. 1990) ("The
Ninth Circuit has not addressed [what constitutes a freely developed and efficient market] nor
set forth pleading requirements for the fraud on the market presumption of reliance.").
150. 123 F.R.D. 333 (D. Or. 1988).
151. The court noted the plaintiffs' failure to state either the amount of stock which was
publicly traded or whether the stock was traded on the NYSE. lI at 340.
152. Id
153. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. The court was also unwilling to deny
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In contrast, In re MDC Holdings Securities Litigation"ss ruled
that the plaintiff's pleadings were inadequate to invoke the FOTM
presumption. MDC Holdings involved a class certification pertaining
to the common stock and subordinated notes of MDC Holdings, Inc.
during the period April 1, 1985 to April 6, 1989. The defendants did
not contest certification as to the stock, which traded on the NYSE.
As to the notes, the defendants argued that certification should be
denied because they traded on the OTC, and plaintiffs had failed to
allege the existence of any of the Cammer factors used to determine
the efficiency of a market for securities. 55 The court rejected the
first argument, but found the second persuasive. 56 The failure to
discuss the activity of the notes, the number of securities analysts
reporting on the notes and the number of market makers troubled the
court.5 7 For this reason, the court required the plaintiffs to amend
their complaint to set forth facts indicating that the notes traded in an
efficient market. It noted that, since some discovery had taken place,
158
this "should not be an insurmountable burden."'
In re Keegan Management Co. Securities Litigation159 exam-

certification because the efficient market question was common to all members of the class
and therefore its existence did not prevent a finding that common issues of law and fact
predominate. Ironically, the court ultimately denied certification because it determined that
individual issues pertaining to special defenses would predominate.
Guenther relied on a pre-Basic California district court case involving a FOTM claim
and the certification of a class-A & J Deutscher Family Fund v. Bullard, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 92,938 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 1986). In A & J Deutscher Family Fund, the plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants' stock traded on the NYSE, that over 5 million shares were
traded during the class period March 1983-February 1984 and that the company regularly
disseminated SEC reports which were examined by market analysts. Defendants made
conclusory statements that the market was inefficient. The court concluded that, based upon
the record, it was inappropriate to determine whether the market was inefficient. Therefore it
certified the class.
154. 754 F. Supp. 785 (S.D. Cal. 1990).
155. Id. at 804-05.
156. Id.
157. Id at 805.
158. Id. MDC Holdings carefully considered whether to resolve the efficient capital
market issue or defer upon it, leaving it to be resolved at trial. In this regard, it noted that
the question involved to a certain extent a question of the merits which could be more
appropriately examined at trial. On the other hand, it stated that whether the class was to be
certified depended upon whether the noteholders benefitted from the FOTM presumption since
the complaint did not allege individual reliance. The court concluded that it was to "walk a
fine line between examining the complaint for facts and allegations that demonstrate that the
class can benefit from the presumption without treading too deeply into the ultimate factual
question of whether the market was efficient." Id. at 804-05.
159. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,275 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 1991).
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ined FOTM claims made with respect to the stock of Keegan Management Company. The context for the action were motions to dismiss under F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) and 9(b). Plaintiffs alleged that the
Keegan stock traded in an active and efficient market, and supported
this allegation by alleging that the stock: (1) was publicly traded on
the NASDAQ; (2) was priced daily in newspapers and financial periodicals; and (3) was followed by financial analysts."6 Defendants
countered that the plaintiff's allegations were deficient because they
did not meet each of Cammer's five factors and that in any event the
market for Keegan stock was not efficient. 16' The court rejected the
first argument because Cammer's factors merely suggest possible
ways of alleging an efficient market and do not delineate the minimum pleading requirements. 62 The court stated the second argument was to be addressed at summary judgment or trial, where the
plaintiffs would have to prove market efficiency.'63 The court ruled
that the plaintiffs had alleged facts sufficient to invoke the FOTM
presumption. "6
In A & J Deutscher Family Fund v. Bullard,'65 the court considered a summary judgment motion as to a FOTM claim. In question
was NYSE stock, Pacific Scientific Corp., Inc., during the class period March 7, 1983 to February 11, 1984. Defendants' expert presented
empirical evidence that the market's behavior was not efficient.
Plaintiffs' expert countered that the market's behavior was not inconsistent with efficiency. The court determined that it was impossible to
resolve the dispute in light of the scarce authority concerning the
application of the FOTM theory, and therefore found summary judgment inappropriate."

160. Mi at 91,479.
161. Id.
162. Id
163. Id.
164. Id. The court's reasoning seems flawed in light of Basic. In this regarded, the court
stated: "[T]his order should not be read to state that plaintiffs' more [sic] proof of their three
supporting allegations cited above will establish that the market was truly efficient ....
This
court does not now decide what facts plaintiffs must prove to establish that the market was
truly efficient." IM. at 91,479; cf. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 n.27 (1988)
(holding that "in order to invoke the presumption, a plaintiff must allege and prove . . .
(3) that the shares were traded on an efficient market").
165. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,121 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 1988). The same case had
previously been before the court on a class certification motion. See supra note 158 for a
discussion of the prior case.
166. Id at 91,274. The court stated: "There is nothing in Basic which suggests that an
empirical analysis is an integral part of showing an efficient market such that, in its absence,
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8.

The Tenth Circuit: Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital
Group, Inc.
In Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, Inc., 67 the
court viewed a motion to dismiss a FOTM claim pertaining to newlyissued revenue bonds. The court agreed with the defendants that the
FOTM presumption did not apply since the plaintiffs
did not allege
68
that the bonds were traded on an efficient market.
9. The Eleventh Circuit: In re-AmeriFirst Securities Litigation
In In re AmeriFirst Securities Litigation,6 9 the district court
relied on the five factors in Cammer in ruling that the common stock
of AmeriFirst Bank ("AmeriFirst") traded on an efficient market. 7 °
In doing so, the court rejected the defendant's argument that the OTC
market, including the NASDAQ-NMS upon which the AmeriFirst
stock traded, was per se inefficient. 7 '
The court, however, did note that because the 50-day class period commenced on the date of AmeriFirst's initial public offering, that
from the date of the offering until sometime thereafter the market was
by definition of a primary nature and therefore inefficient.' 7 Accordingly, plaintiffs' purchasing stock during this time period could
not rely on the fraud-on-the-market theory, but could possibly rely on
the fraud created the market theory. 7 3

the market must be found inefficient as a matter of law." Id Bullard is unusual in that the
court evaluated rebuttal evidence, though it found this evidence inconclusive.
167. 763 F. Supp. 1552 (D. Colo. 1991).
168. Id. at 1557. The plaintiffs did not contest this ruling, but rather cited cases invoking
the fraud created the market theory. See supra note 95. Consequentially, the court interpreted
the amended complaint as asserting this second type of presumptive reliance. See Bank of
Denver, 763 F. Supp. at 1557.
169. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 96,419 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 1991).
170. The plaintiffs responded to each of the five factors in Cammer as follows:
(1) during the class period more than 94 million shares were traded, with an average weekly
volume of approximately 575,000 shares and an average weekly turnover of 5.2%; (2) six
securities analysts issued reports on the stock during the class period; (3) the stock had over
20 market makers who reacted swiftly to AmeriFirst's reported financial reports;
(4) AmeriFirst was unable to use Form S-3, but only because of timing considerations; and
(5) the stock responded swiftly to public information. Id at 91,821.
171. Id at 91,820.
172. Id at 91,821.
173. Id See supra note 95; see also Tapken v. Brown, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,805 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 1992) (same court invokes FOTM presumption as to stock traded
on the NYSE where plaintiffs' allegations were essentially uncontroverted).
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D. Conclusion
The judicial analysis of the FOTM question has been documented in a flurry of court decisions on pretrial motions subsequent to
Basic. The cases generally assume that all securities traded on the
NYSE or AMEX trade in an efficient market. 7 Only one case, Epstein v. American Reserve Corp.,t75 held that OTC securities do not
trade in an efficient market. The several OTC cases decided after
Epstein hold either that the securities at issue trade in an efficient
market or defer decision on the question until trial.176 Where the
issue arises in the context of a class certification motion, deferring the
issue until trial conflicts with the Supreme Court's handling of the
matter in Basic. Moreover, irrespective of the procedural context,
failure to definitively rale on these motions, combined with the high
settlement rate of cases in this area of the law, results in a system in
which plaintiffs possess substantial and unjustifiable settlement leverage. Where the cases involve securities traded on a primary market,
typically revenue bonds, the cases find that the FOTM theory does
not apply.l"
IV.

PROPOSED APPLICATION OF THE THEORY

Our discussion has shown that the Commission takes a restrictive
view of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis while the courts take
an expansive approach. Quantifying the approaches reveals that under
the SEC standard, about 32% of NYSE or AMEX listed companies
and NASDAQ quoted entities (at the time of the system's adoption)
were eligible for reduced disclosure. On the other hand, the courts
impose the FOTM theory on almost 100% of similarly situated issuers.
This section examines the various possible combinations of judicial and regulatory approaches and their impact upon securities regulation. First, we look at a system with broad issuer eligibility to use
the integrated disclosure system for the registration of securities, and
narrow investor ability to utilize the FOTM theory in class action
suits. This approach reflects an expansive view of the ECMH in the
174. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
175. 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3382 (N.D. Il1. Apr. 20, 1988). See supra notes 150-153
and accompanying text.
176. See generally supra note 96.
177. See supra notes 95-97.
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former instance, and a narrow perspective in the latter. Next, we look
at the present system, with restrictive registration provisions and expanded liability. Finally, we turn to a system featuring relative equality among the registration and liability provisions.
A system where eligibility to use the integrated disclosure system
is broad and the ability of aggrieved investors to utilize the FOTM
theory is narrow thwarts the goals of the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Under this approach, issuers
would have the benefit of Form S-3 registration and reduced disclosure requirements, but investors would not have the similar broad
ability to assert FOTM reliance. This system would result in uniformed investors, incapable of policing the fair and accurate dissemination of market information. The result is unsatisfactory, and probably impossible from a practical point of view, since the courts are
unlikely to reverse their trend.
The present system of restricted registration benefits and expansive FOTM use has been the focus of this article. Basically, this system forces issuers to undergo the expensive exercise of providing
complete information when registering securities while the courts
relieve investors of their duties to examine this information. Many
might call this system the best of all worlds because the investor has
maximum protection. However, every dollar in legal, accounting, and
other fees spent registering securities is a dollar that cannot be paid
out as a dividend or spent on manufacturing. Therefore, investors are
"paying" for the protection of prospectuses which they do not need.
Under the current application of the FOTM theory, the extra expense
of complying with Form S-1 for an exchange traded issuer is a loss
both to the investor and the issuer. Moreover, the investor receives no
corresponding benefit. Under the climate of trying to make our markets more efficient, the present system appears ripe for change.
The final possibility involves narrowing the discrepancy between
the application of the ECMH to the integrated disclosure system and
the FOTM theory. This result could be accomplished by the expansion of the integrated disclosure system by the SEC, ideally combined
with a restriction of the use of the FOTM tleory in establishing liability. Under this scenario, investors would receive adequate judicial
protection, while issuers and those investing in them would receive a
further cost reduction through the elimination of unnecessary documentation and possibly decreased litigation costs.
Expanding the use of the integrated disclosure system would
enhance the reliability of '34 Act reporting because issuers permitted
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to use the system would know that their '34 Act reports would be
incorporated by reference into their '33 Act registration statements,
thus subjecting them to the in terrorem impact of the '33 Act. The
change would enable the SEC to acknowledge technological advances
of the past ten years and is consistent with the flexibility the Commission has previously shown in updating the registration provisions.
Reducing the application of the FOTM theory of reliance constitutes the second phase of a responsible plan to narrow the discrepancy in the application of the ECMH. This approach could be accomplished through Commission rulemaking or Congressional legislation
restricting courts in their application of the theory. While this action
would be desirable, the SEC and Congress have never advanced a
restrictive approach to Rule 10b-5 as it applies to class action suits.
In addition to the legislative or regulatory action, the present judicial
approach merits further scrutiny. The case law indicates a bias favoring plaintiffs, which conflicts with the Supreme Court's holding in
Basic. This bias could be diminished by an articulation that the
FOTM question is to be resolved at the class certification stage, consistent with Basic.
V.

CONCLUSION

Any attempt to precisely match the benefits of the registration
provisions with the burdens imposed by the applicability of the
FOTM theory would be futile. Therefore, the changes made should
err toward the present system of overprotection of investors to ensure
that it carries out the fundamental purposes of securities regulation.
A present imbalance exists between the application of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis to the registration and antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, respectively. Narrowing the discrepancy in the application of the theory through a combination of expanding the integrated
disclosure system and reducing the application of the FOTM theory
of reliance would help provide a more viable system which balances
the interests of short term investors, long term investors, and companies using the capital markets.
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ADDENDUM

In July, 1992, the SEC proposed amending the integrated disclosure system to expand the eligibility for Form S-3."7 8 The proposed
changes may well be adopted by or shortly after publication of this
Article. If adopted, these changes reflect a step towards a more consistent application of the ECM- in the registration provisions of the
'33 Act, and in the liability provision of Rule 10b-5 promulgated
pursuant to the '34 Act. However, Release 6493 fails to acknowledge
the connection between the application of the ECMH to the registration provisions of the '33 Act and Rule 10b-5 class action suits.
One proposed change would expand the class of issuers eligible
for Form S-3 through reduction of the transactional requirements. The
Commission proposes to reduce the public float requirement from
$150 million to $75 million.179 Release 6493 notes that this change
would expand the number of companies eligible for Form S-3 by
449, from 1510 to 1959.18 Three hundred and seventy-four, or
83%, of these new companies trade on the NYSE, AMEX, or
NASDAQ-NMS markets.' This change would diminish the inconsistency between the application of the ECMH to the registration and
liability provisions, but would not eliminate it. Significantly, the securities of Basic, Inc., the issuer deemed to trade in an efficient market
in the Supreme Court's one pronouncement on the FOTM question,' 82 had a float of at most $45 million during the pertinent class
period. 183 Thus, Basic, Inc., though deemed to trade in an efficient
market for purposes of Rule 10b-5, would have fallen substantially
short of Form S-3 eligibility under the current SEC proposal.
Another proposed change illustrates the deficiency of Release
6493 in failing to acknowledge the connection between the FOTM
cases and the Form S-3 requirements. Release 6493 proposes expanding the classes of issuers eligible for Form S-3 registration by reduc-

178. Securities Act Release No. 6493/Exchange Act Release No. 30,930 (July 16, 1992)
[hereinafter "Release 6493"].
179. The Commission set forth an alternative, additional requirement of a three million
share annual trading volume for companies with floats between $75 and $150 million. The
release indicates that adding this test substantially reduces the number of companies that
would be newly eligible for Form S-3 under the proposal. See Release 6493, supra note 178.
180. Id
181. Id
182. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
183. See supra note 6.
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ing the required length of reporting obligations. Specifically, Release
6493 would decrease the required reporting time of an issuer from 36
to 12 months. This change is consistent with the approach taken by
the most frequently cited FOTM case, Cammer v. Bloom."s The
Commission bases this recommendation on the same theory as
Cammer: issuers meeting the Form S-3 public float requirements for
primary equity offerings possess a sufficient market following such
that a three year reporting history will not materially enhance the
market following of those issuers."8 5 This reduction seems appropriate as it is of sufficient length to enable the Commission to satisfy
itself that the issuer intends to carry out its reporting obligations
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, but not so burdensome as
to overly restrict the number of available issuers.
The proposed changes represent a step forward in a consistent
application of the ECMH, whether or not the Commission intended
such a result. The recommendation of an approach previously utilized
by the district court in Cammer indicates the similarity of the issues
faced by the SEC and the courts. Absent acknowledgement of the
link between the ECMH as applied to the registration and liability
provisions of the federal securities laws, the capital markets will remain subject to the erratic application of the ECMH discussed in this
article. In light of the SEC's superior expertise in regulating the capital markets, Release 6493 provides a good opportunity for the Commission to examine this connection and provide guidance to courts in
determining whether an issuer trades in an efficient capital market.

184. 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989). The Cammer test has been adopted by the Third
Circuit in Stinson v. Van Valley Development Corp., 714 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1989),
aff'd, 897 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1990). The test has also been relied upon as substantial authority in other circuits. See Freeman v. Laventhol & Horvath, 915 F.2d 195, 199 (6th Cir.
1990); Greenberg v. Boettcher & Co., 755 F. Supp. 776, 782 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (Seventh
Circuit); In re Keegan Management Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,275 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 10, 1991) (Ninth Circuit); In re AmeriFirst Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,410 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 1991) (Eleventh Circuit).
185. See Release, supra note 178; cf Cammer 711 F. Supp. at 1285 ("The *public float'
aspect of the Form S-3 requirements ensures that enough investors have in fact read the
previously filed document.").
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